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Abstract (142/150 words) 
 
Dual-process theories posit two distinct types of cognitive processing: Type 1, which 
does not use working memory making it fast and automatic, and Type 2, which does 
use working memory making it slow and effortful. Mathematics often relies on the 
inhibition of pervasive Type 1 processing in order to apply new skills or knowledge 
that require Type 2 processing. In two studies we demonstrate that giving participants 
a difficult task (Raven’s Matrices) before a task that requires the inhibition of intuitive 
responses (the Cognitive Reflection Test) significantly improves performance. Our 
findings suggest that encountering a difficult task that requires Type 2 processing 
before completing a task that requires inhibition of Type 1 processing may encourage 
an enduring ‘Type 2’ mind-set, whereby participants are more likely to spontaneously 
use Type 2 processing for a period of time. Implications for mathematics education 
are discussed. 
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Increasing cognitive inhibition with a difficult prior task: 
Implications for mathematical thinking. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Dual-process theories 
Dual-process theories of thinking have developed in many areas of cognitive 
psychology, including reasoning, decision-making and memory. Recently, dual-
process theories have also been applied to mathematical thinking (e.g. Chernoff 2012, 
Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken and Verschaffel 2009a, Gómez-Chacon, García-
Madruga, Vila, Elosúa and Rodríguez 2013, Leron 2010). Here, we argue that an 
intervention based on dual-process theory might improve students’ mathematical 
thinking in many areas where intuition must be inhibited in favour of applying 
mathematical rules. 
There are many versions of dual-process theory and while they vary in their 
specifics, there are some key shared characteristics. All propose at least two types of 
processing which we will refer to as Type 1 and Type 2 processing (Evans and 
Stanovich 2013). Type 1 processing does not require working memory, making it fast 
and automatic (e.g. recognising a friend’s face). Type 2 processing depends on 
working memory, making it slower and more effortful (e.g. memorising a phone 
number). While Type 1 processing is constantly engaged and beyond our control, 
Type 2 processing can be engaged to differing levels depending on the individual and 
the situation. For example, individuals differ in their thinking disposition making 
them more or less willing to engage in effortful Type 2 thinking in general (Stanovich 
2009). Individuals also differ in their capacity for Type 2 thinking, so that when it is 
engaged it may be more or less efficient between individuals (Stanovich 2009). 
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Situational factors such as time available (Evans, Handley and Bacon 2009) and 
perceptual difficulty of the task (e.g. hard-to-read fonts, Alter et al. 2007) can also 
influence the extent of Type 2 thinking. Bornemann, Foth, Horn, Ries, Warmuth, 
Wartenburger and van der Meer (2010) found that students with higher general 
cognitive abilities allocated more processing resources to a novel geometric task than 
their less able counterparts and showed better performance. However, they did not 
allocate more resources to a familiar algebraic-transformation task, yet still showed 
better performance. This suggests that high-ability individuals can engage different 
levels of Type 2 processing depending on the task at hand. 
Type 1 thinking is thought to be evolutionarily old (Evans 2003), making it 
well equipped to deal effectively and efficiently with most tasks that we face. 
However, there are times when Type 1 thinking is not sufficient, or even 
counterproductive, and Type 2 thinking must be used in order to reach a goal, in 
particular, novel or modern tasks such as making an insurance claim, taking an exam, 
or proving a theorem. Of interest here are cases where Type 1 thinking and Type 2 
thinking differ in their solutions to a problem, i.e. where intuition conflicts with 
reason. In these cases it is important for Type 1 intuitions to be inhibited in favour of 
Type 2 processing. There are three main perspectives on how this intervention occurs: 
the parallel-competitive, pre-emptive and default-interventionist perspectives.  
Parallel-competitive theories (e.g. Sloman 1996) suggest that Type 1 and Type 
2 thinking work on a problem simultaneously from the start. If they come to the same 
answer, the processing ends and the answer is given. If the processes give conflicting 
answers, Type 2 thinking can override Type 1 thinking, but because Type 1 thinking 
is much faster than Type 2 thinking it often wins the competition.  
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Pre-emptive theories suggest that it is decided at the outset of a task, based on 
its superficial characteristics, which type of processing will be used, and so there is 
never a conflict between different responses. For example, when faced with a 
syllogism with an unbelievable conclusion, it is decided on first reading that Type 2 
processing should be used to evaluate it (Evans, Newstead and Byrne 1993). 
Finally, default-interventionist theories (e.g. Evans 2006) suggest that Type 1 
processing is the default way to solve any task, but in some cases Type 2 thinking can 
be engaged and potentially override the Type 1 response. In Evans’s model, Type 1 
thinking provides an answer which is subject to evaluation. This answer is often 
deemed to be plausible and is given as the response. Occasionally, however, the Type 
1 answer is not found to be satisfactory and the problem is re-processed with Type 2 
thinking.  
In the current paper, we adopt a default-interventionist perspective on the 
interaction between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. The nature of Type 2 thinking 
intervention from this perspective is discussed in more detail below in Section 1.3. 
First, however, we discuss the evidence that Type 1 and Type 2 processes can conflict 
in mathematics, and that incorrect answers from Type 1 thinking often win. 
 
1.2 Cases of conflict in mathematical thinking 
There are several areas of mathematics where Type 2 thinking is essential, but 
where intuition can get in the way. A first example is in dealing with rational 
numbers. Verschaffel, Van Dooren and colleagues (e.g. Obersteiner, Van Dooren, 
Van Hoof and Verschaffel 2013, Vamvakoussi, Van Dooren and Verschaffel 2012, 
Van Hoof, Lijnen, Verschaffel and Van Dooren 2013) have documented a ‘Natural 
Number Bias’, which occurs when knowledge of natural numbers interferes with 
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operations involving rational numbers (see also Christou 2015, this issue; Van Hoof, 
Janssen, Verschaffel and Van Dooren 2015, this issue). For example when comparing 
the fractions 2/5 and 2/7, students may have an intuition that the latter is larger than 
the former based on their long-held knowledge of natural numbers and the fact that as 
natural numbers 7 is larger than 5. This may not lead to an incorrect response, but the 
conflict between the intuitive response (Type 1 process) and knowledge of the correct 
response (Type 2 process) may be revealed in longer reaction times for correct 
answers to incongruent problems compared to correct answers to congruent problems 
(e.g. 2/5 vs 3/5, Van Hoof, Lijnen, Verschaffel and Van Dooren 2013). The natural 
number bias persists into adulthood, even in expert mathematicians (Obersteiner, Van 
Dooren, Van Hoof and Verschaffel 2013), and has been documented in fraction 
comparison and arithmetic operations (Vamvakoussi, Van Dooren and Verschaffel 
2012). 
A second example where intuition can conflict with correct mathematical 
responses is in proportional reasoning. Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken and 
Verschaffel (2009b) investigated the tendency for adults to give proportional answers 
to nonproportional mathematics problems, such as “Ellen and Kim are running around 
a track. They run equally fast but Ellen started later. When Ellen has run 5 laps, Kim 
has run 15 laps. When Ellen has run 30 laps, how many has Kim run?”. The correct 
answer is 40 (e.g., “30 + 10 = 40” or “15 + 25 = 40”), but it is common for 
participants to give a proportional answer of “30 × 3 = 90” (Van Dooren, De Bock, 
Hessel, Janssens and Verschaffel 2005). Even trainee teachers were prone to this error 
(Cramer, Post and Currier 1993). Gillard et al argued that because proportional 
reasoning is such an important tool in everyday life and early education, students 
become very familiar and competent with it and become vulnerable to applying it 
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where it is inappropriate. By giving participants proportional and nonproportional 
problems either under a short time limit or under a working memory load, Gillard et 
al demonstrated that proportional errors stem from Type 1 thinking while overriding 
them depends on Type 2 thinking. 
A third example of conflict between Type 1 and Type 2 processes occurs in 
geometry, where students tend to associate a larger shape area with a larger perimeter 
despite this not always being the case (see Figure 1). This is thought to be due to an 
intuitive more A (e.g. area) – more B (e.g. perimeter) rule (Babai, Shalev and Stavy 
2015, this issue; Stavy and Tirosh 1996; Stavy, Tsamir and Tirosh 2002), which can 
lead to errors on incongruent problems such as those in Figure 1 A, or longer reaction  
 
Figure 1. Example perimeter comparison problems where the area and perimeter are 
a) incongruent or b) congruent. 
 
A) Incongruent perimeter comparison problem. The shape on the left has 
a larger area but equal perimeter to the shape on the right.
B) Congruent perimeter comparison problem. The shape on the right has 
a larger area and a larger perimeter compared to the shape on the left.
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times if the rule is overridden in favour of Type 2 processing (Stavy and Babai 2010). 
Stavy and Babai demonstrated that, in educated adults, accuracy was lower for 
incongruent than for congruent problems, that correct responses to incongruent 
problems took longer than correct responses to congruent problems, and that correct 
responses to incongruent but not congruent problems activated brain areas associated 
with executive control (i.e. processes involved in managing cognition, such as 
inhibition). Furthermore, they demonstrated that an intervention designed to draw 
attention to the relevant variable (perimeter) significantly improved 14 and 15 year 
olds’ performance on incongruent comparisons and increased their response times, 
suggesting an increase in Type 2 thinking. This finding is encouraging because it 
demonstrates that it is possible to increase reliance on Type 2 thinking in situations 
where Type 1 and Type 2 thinking conflict. 
A fourth example of the conflict between intuition and reason in mathematics is in 
the area of probability. Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken and Verschaffel (2009c) tested 
a dual-process model of the bias to rely on frequency over probability when choosing 
between gambles. When participants are confronted with two possible gambles, such 
as those in Figure 2, and asked to choose the one with the best chance of picking a 
black marble, they may incorrectly choose the one with a larger number of black 
marbles over the one with a more favourable ratio of black marbles to white marbles. 
The finding that correct responses to incongruent items take significantly longer than 
intuitive responses suggests that the bias stems from Type 1 processing and that it can 
be inhibited and overridden by Type 2 processing, although this takes additional time. 
A fifth and final example of the conflict between intuition and mathematics is the 
classic students and professors problem (Clement, Lockhead and Monk 1981), which 
has recently been interpreted in terms of dual process theory (Leron and Hazzan 
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Figure 2. Example probability comparison problems where frequency and ratio of 
black marbles (targets) to white marbles (non-targets) are a) congruent or b) 
incongruent. 
 
2006). The task is to write an equation for the statement “There are six times as many 
students as professors at this university” using S to represent the number of students 
and P to represent the number of professors. A common but incorrect response is “6S 
= P” (Clement et al. 1981). Leron and Hazzan suggested that Type 1 processing gives 
the pairing 6S, because of the phrase “six times as many students”, and this is not 
overridden by Type 2 processing. Had the participants engaged Type 2 processing, 
they could have given the correct answer because they had the knowledge necessary 
to do so. 
We have discussed several examples where intuition may conflict with reason in 
mathematical thinking (and other examples exist, see for example Lem 2015, this 
issue, on the law of large numbers). In each case, Type 1 processing leads to a 
response that is not always appropriate, and Type 2 thinking is necessary to override 
this response. A goal of mathematics education is to foster Type 2 thinking in cases 
such as these. However, the biases we have discussed are not short-lived problems 
that are overcome during formal education, rather they persist into adulthood 
reflecting the pervasiveness of Type 1 thinking and the difficulty of consistently 
a) Congruent trial b) Incongruent trial
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engaging Type 2 thinking. This leads us on to the question of how we decide when to 
use Type 2 thinking, and how we might help students to use more Type 2 thinking in 
cases where it is necessary.  
 
1.3 Inhibiting Type 1 thinking errors 
The recent adoption of dual process theories in mathematics education has led 
to a consideration of interventions to improve students’ mathematical thinking. Leron 
and Hazzan (2006) have pointed out that training Type 2 thinking is not the solution, 
because in most cases where students show intuition-based errors they already have 
the knowledge and skills available to find the correct answer, they just fail to use 
them. Similarly, Type 1 thinking is difficult to manipulate (Lem, Onghena, 
Verschaffel and Van Dooren 2013, Tirosh, Stavy and Cohen 1998), as demonstrated 
by the fact that the biases discussed above persist throughout schooling and can be 
observed in educated adults.  
Instead of targeting interventions at Type 1 or Type 2 processes themselves, 
the solution may lie in encouraging students to question their Type 1 thinking and 
more often override it with Type 2 thinking. There is evidence that individuals may be 
aware when there is a conflict between their intuition and reason, which provides an 
opportunity for us to encourage them to act on this conflict more often (De Neys, 
Vartanian and Goel 2008; Lubin, Simon, Houdé and De Neys 2015, this issue). This 
is the perspective we take on inhibition in the current paper, i.e. we are interested in 
increasing the tendency to inhibit the output of Type 1 processing. 
Tirosh et al (1998) observed students’ tendency to follow two intuitive rules: 
‘everything comes to an end’ and ‘everything can be divided’. They then attempted to 
reduce students’ use of these rules by presenting them with conflicting arguments 
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from two hypothetical students and asking them to determine which, if any, of the 
arguments were correct and to justify their answer. This could be expected to draw the 
students’ attention to the conflict and encourage them to evaluate the two arguments 
with Type 2 thinking, but unfortunately, the intervention did not significantly change 
the students’ reliance on the intuitive rules at post-test. 
On the other hand, Houdé et al. (2000) successfully trained students to avoid 
matching bias1 by warning them about the bias and instructing them in how to avoid 
it. The training and testing utilised different tasks, so this was not a simple case of 
showing participants how to complete the task correctly. Rather, it was designed to 
make participants aware of the trap they may fall into in order to help them avoid it. 
As well as a large shift from incorrect to correct responding, the intervention resulted 
in a shift in the brain areas that were active during reasoning.  
Similarly, Lem et al (2013) attempted to reduce undergraduate students’ 
intuitive errors in their interpretation of box plots by giving them a very detailed and 
explicit explanation of how to correctly interpret a box plot. Although the students did 
give more correct responses after the intervention than before, their reaction times for 
correct responses to counterintuitive problems suggested that they still encountered 
incorrect heuristics (as mentioned above, Type 1 processing is very difficult to 
manipulate); they were simply able to override them. 
Although these interventions had some success, a downside is that they are 
task-specific. The same issue applies to Stavy and Babai’s (2010) intervention that 
was discussed above, and ideally an intervention to encourage the use of Type 2 
thinking would be task-general so that it could be applied across several areas of 
mathematics, and even in non-mathematical domains.  
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Recently, several authors have proposed metacognitive processes that monitor the 
output of Type 1 processing and determine when Type 2 thinking will be engaged 
(e.g. Thompson 2009, Stanovich 2009), and these processes may provide a domain-
general target for interventions. Thompson proposed that Type 1 outputs come with 
an associated ‘feeling of rightness’ (FOR). The FOR is an affective construct with 
little cognitive content. Thompson suggested that if an answer that came from Type 1 
thinking has a high FOR, the individual will be likely to accept that answer without 
questioning it. If the answer comes with a low FOR, however, the individual will be 
more likely to inhibit it and tackle the problem with Type 2 thinking. This suggests 
that individuals have a threshold for what they consider to be a sufficient FOR, and 
this may vary between and within individuals.  
Thompson, Prowse Turner and Pennycook (2011) found evidence that FOR 
affected behaviour in four reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to provide a quick 
initial response to each question (heavily influenced by Type 1 processes), indicate 
how ‘right’ the answer felt (FOR), and were then allowed as much time as they 
wanted to come to a final answer (potentially, although not necessarily, based on 
Type 2 thinking). Initial answers that were associated with a low FOR were 
associated with longer re-thinking times for the second answer, suggesting that low 
FOR prompts more Type 2 thinking. Low FOR was also associated with a higher 
probability of changing one’s answer when allowed time to re-think, indicating that 
FOR influenced trust in the intuitive answer at a behavioural level.  
Stanovich (2009) similarly proposed a reflective level of cognition, which is 
superordinate to what he calls the autonomic (Type 1) and algorithmic (Type 2) levels 
(metacognition is generally considered to be a form of Type 2 thinking and Stanovich 
does not dispute this, but he describes the algorithmic and reflective aspects of Type 2 
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thinking as subordinate and superordinate, respectively). The reflective level consists 
of thinking disposition, which is an individual’s tendency to value effortful thought 
and their willingness to engage it, and this can also vary between individuals. Those 
who value effortful thought would be more likely to inhibit the output of their Type 1 
processing when working in a domain that they consider important, opting instead to 
evaluate the problem with Type 2 thinking. 
Thompson’s FOR threshold and Stanovich’s reflective level (which are not 
mutually exclusive, but may be considered parts of the same metacognition construct) 
provide potential targets for interventions to increase the inhibition of Type 1 thinking 
and the adoption of Type 2 thinking. As mentioned above, situational factors can 
determine whether Type 1 or Type 2 thinking is used, including time available, 
instructions and perceptual difficulty of the task, and these factors may be working 
through such mechanisms. For example, Alter et al (2007) showed that presenting 
tasks in a difficult-to-read font increased Type 2 thinking, and they suggested that this 
was because the perceptual difficulty of the task prompted participants think that the 
task itself was going to be difficult. This may have had the effect of altering their 
threshold for FOR or priming their reflective level of cognition to override ‘easy’ 
answers. One of the tasks that Alter at al used was the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT, Frederick 2005, Figure 3), which is useful for investigating Type 2 process 
engagement because the task strongly prompts intuitive but incorrect answers, and the 
correct answers are fairly simple to calculate if Type 2 thinking is engaged and the 
intuitive answer inhibited. Participants’ responses are therefore thought to be a good 
reflection of whether or not they have inhibited their Type 1 intuitions. 
Thompson et al (2013) distinguished between two types of fluency that affect 
participants’ level of Type 2 thinking on tasks such as the CRT where there is a 
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1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat cost £1 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? ______ pence 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? ______ minutes 
3. In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for 
the patch to cover half of the lake? ______ days 
 
Figure 3. Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test. The correct answers are 5 
pence, 5 minutes and 47 days, but participants often give the intuitive answers 10 
pence, 100 minutes and 24 days. 
 
conflict between Type 1 and 2 processing: answer fluency, i.e. the ease with which an 
answer comes to mind (which is directly related to FOR), and perceptual fluency, i.e. 
the ease with which the task as a whole is perceived on a superficial level (varying, 
for example, due to font manipulations). The authors investigated the effects of both 
types of fluency on the rate of Type 2 processing across seven experiments, and 
consistently failed to replicate Alter et al’s (2007) findings that perceptual fluency 
impacted on extent of Type 2 processing. Answer fluency, on the other hand, 
consistently affected processing. This suggests that perceptual fluency may not be a 
reliable method of encouraging students to engage Type 2 processing, but since 
answer fluency is a property of the processes that lead to an answer, it is not likely to 
be malleable by short-term interventions.  
 
1.4. The present studies 
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Here we aimed to test a new method of manipulating students’ inclination to 
inhibit Type 1 thinking on the CRT; a method that does not rely on changing the 
perceptual or answer fluency of the problem. The method was intended to influence 
the individual’s metacognitive processes, such as the reflective level of cognition or 
the threshold for FOR (i.e. the level of ‘rightness’ that was required of an answer 
before the individual would be willing to accept it without further scrutiny). We gave 
participants an explicitly difficult task, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(RAPM), before giving them the CRT. RAPM items do not prompt a strong intuitive 
answer so Type 2 processing is essential (unless an answer is picked at random), and 
because the RAPM items are difficult the level of Type 2 processing required is high. 
We hypothesised that this would have a similar but more reliable effect on responses 
than perceptual fluency manipulations because participants experience actual task-
processing difficulty immediately prior to completing the relevant task, as opposed to 
perceptual difficulty at a purely superficial level. By targeting the metacognitive 
processes responsible for intervention in this way, we aimed to put participants in an 
enduring mind-set of needing to engage Type 2 thinking, in the process inhibiting 
Type 1 processing.   
If successful, this intervention could help students to overcome incorrect 
intuitions in mathematical problems such as those described above. Because Type 1 
thinking is so pervasive, students would still be aware of the intuitive answers to 
problems, but they may experience a conflict between this answer and their 
metacognitive processes which encourage them to think the problem through more 
carefully. Not only would they be more likely to give correct answers, but the 
experience of the conflict and of the benefit of engaging more effortful thinking (i.e. 
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coming up with a different answer to their first intuition) may teach them to question 
their intuitions more frequently in the future. 
In Study 1 we asked participants to complete the CRT either before or after 
completing a subset of 18 items from RAPM with a 10 minute time limit, and we 
show that completing the RAPM items first significantly improved performance on 
the CRT. In Study 2 we asked participants to complete the CRT after completing 
zero, one, three or five RAPM items, and show that one RAPM item was sufficient to 
improve CRT performance compared to zero, while additional items did not provide 
any additional benefit (i.e. the effect was not cumulative). 
 
2. Study 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Design 
 The study followed a between-subjects experimental design. The independent 
variable was order of tasks (RAPM first or CRT first), and the dependent variable was 
number of correct answers on the CRT task. The study was approved by the 
Loughborough University Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee. 
2.1.2 Participants 
Participants were 61 second year undergraduate students from engineering 
courses at Loughborough University. Participants took part during a lab session for an 
introductory statistics module and later analysed the data for their coursework 
assignment. All participants gave informed consent for their data to be used for 
research purposes. 
2.1.3 Tasks 
17 
 
Participants completed an 18-item subset of Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (RAPM, Raven, Raven and Court 1998) with a 10 minute time limit. This 
subset was selected for an undergraduate population in previous research by removing 
items on which there tended to be floor or ceiling effects (Sá, West and Stanovich 
1999). In each item a 3×3 matrix displayed a pattern with a piece missing. 
Participants decided which of eight spare pieces completed the pattern, and pressed 
the corresponding number key on a standard keyboard. Each item was presented until 
response. If participants finished all 18 items in less than 10 minutes the task ended, 
otherwise the task was automatically terminated after 10 minutes.  
Participants also completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, 
Frederick 2005). Each item was presented individually on screen until response, in a 
random order. Participants typed in their answer and pressed the spacebar to continue. 
Both tasks were administered using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman and Zuccolotto 
2002).  
2.1.4 Procedure 
The study took place in groups in a computer lab with participants attending 
one of three sessions. Approximately 20 participants attended each session. 
Participants were seated at computers and instructed to work alone and in silence. The 
experiment program randomly allocated each participant to one of the two order 
conditions; 32 participants did the CRT first and 29 did the RAPM first. After the 
CRT and RAPM tasks, participants completed several other tasks that are not relevant 
to the current research question. Because the RAPM and CRT tasks were completed 
first, performance could not be influenced by the subsequent tasks. 
 
2.2 Results 
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The mean number of CRT items answered correctly by each group is shown in 
Figure 4. The number of correct answers to the CRT was compared across groups 
using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test, due to the limited scale (0-3). The 
RAPM first group scored significantly higher (M = 1.72, SD = 1.10) than the CRT 
first group (M = 1.16, SD = 1.08), U(61) = 597.0, z = 1.99, p = .047, indicating that 
completing the RAPM task first significantly improved CRT performance, as  
predicted2. The effect size was medium, Cohen’s d = .51, with CRT scores being 48% 
higher after 10 minutes of RAPM items compared to the CRT being completed first. 
Conversely, RAPM scores did not significantly differ between the RAPM first (M = 
 
Figure 4. Mean number of correct responses to the three CRT questions in the RAPM 
first and CRT first groups. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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9.10, SD = 2.79) and CRT first groups (M = 8.47, SD = 3.41), t(59) = .790, p = .432.  
There was a significant correlation between RAPM and CRT scores, rs(61) 
=.385, p = .002, which replicates previous findings that performance on the CRT is 
related to individual differences in intelligence – more intelligent individuals are more 
likely to engage in effortful thinking, or to do so more effectively, than less intelligent 
individuals. However, the similarity of RAPM scores in the two groups suggests that 
this effect did not contribute to the difference in CRT scores between groups. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
Participants completed a difficult subset of RAPM items before or after 
completing the CRT. The CRT questions prompt intuitive but incorrect responses 
which can be overridden by engaging effortful thinking to evaluate one’s answers. 
Those who completed the RAPM items first scored significantly higher on the CRT, 
i.e. they were more likely to engage effortful thinking to overcome their intuitions.  
The effect did not occur in the opposite direction – RAPM scores did not differ 
depending on whether or not the CRT was completed first. 
 RAPM items cannot be solved with Type 1 thinking alone and as such require 
Type 2 thinking. It appears that this experience has a lasting effect on the likelihood 
of Type 2 thinking intervention on a subsequent task for which Type 2 thinking is not 
necessary in order to produce a response (in so far as Type 1 thinking does provide a 
response, albeit an incorrect one). Our findings suggest that it is possible to 
manipulate the likelihood of engaging Type 2 thinking, but our intervention was fairly 
intensive (up to 10 minutes long). In Study 2, we investigated whether the same effect 
could be found with a more practical intervention, and whether the intensity of the 
intervention had a cumulative effect on subsequent task performance.   
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3. Study 2  
We found encouraging results using a 10 minute difficult task, but 10 minutes 
could be considered a long time in the context of a school lesson or university lecture. 
Next, we investigated whether giving participants only 1, 3 or 5 RAPM items would 
have a similar effect. We did not include an 18 item condition for two reasons: first, 
the study was conducted online and we had no direct contact with participants, 
meaning so many items may lead to a disproportionately high dropout rate compared 
to the other conditions, and second, because so many items would be impractical for 
the classroom and the aim of the study was to determine whether the intervention was 
effective at more practical intensities.  
In Study 2 we were also interested in whether the effect of prompting Type 2 
thinking would be cumulative. In other words, would asking participants to tackle 
multiple RAPM items be more effective at prompting Type 2 thinking than asking 
them to tackle one? 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design 
 The study was administered online and followed a between-subjects 
experimental design. The independent variable was number of RAPM items with four 
conditions: zero, one, three or five. The dependent variable was number of correct 
answers to the CRT. The study was approved by the Loughborough University Ethics 
Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee. 
3.1.2 Participants 
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Participants were 489 adults (307 male, 179 female, 3 unspecified), aged 20 – 
65 (M = 28.36, SD = 9.09), who were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and completed the study online in exchange for 20 cents (USD).  
3.1.3 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.MTurk.com) is an open online marketplace 
for recruiting ‘workers’. It allows ‘requesters’ to post tasks that can be completed at a 
computer (such as surveys, writing, transcription, data entry and experiments), which 
registered workers can be paid to complete. Over 100,000 workers are registered from 
over 100 counties, and between them they complete thousands of tasks every day 
(Pontin 2007). Workers can browse and select tasks that they want to complete, and 
after satisfactory completion they are paid. The rate of pay is usually low (often 
around $1 per hour), but research suggests that workers are intrinsically motivated 
(Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling 2011). Buhrmester et al have shown that MTurk 
can be used to obtain high-quality research data quickly and inexpensively. 
Participants recruited via MTurk are more demographically diverse than those 
recruited at universities (Buhrmester et al. 2011, Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis. 
2010), the rate of pay does not affect data quality (Mason and Watts 2009), and the 
data are as reliable as those collected through traditional methods (Buhrmester et al. 
2011, Paolacci et a., 2010).  
Web-based research methods more generally have been found to provide 
results consistent with those found using traditional methods (Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava and John 2004; Krantz and Dalal 2000), and there are many advantages 
which make this a useful and promising tool for recruiting research participants 
(Reips 2000). However, there are some limitations to internet studies, such as higher 
dropout rates (Birnbaum 2004, Piper 1998), lack of control over the testing 
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environment (Hecht, Oesker, Kaiser, Civelek and Stecker 1999), and increased 
opportunity for dishonesty (Suri, Goldstein and Mason 2011). 
3.1.4 Tasks  
Five of the 18 RAPM items used in Study 1 were selected on the basis of 
having similar levels of difficulty (items 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 from Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices Set II), which was determined by scores in a previous 
data set (Attridge and Inglis 2013). Participants saw zero, one, three or five of these 
items and, as before, selected one of eight pieces to complete the pattern. The three 
CRT items were presented one at a time, in a set order, and participants typed in their 
response. Both tasks were programmed in Wextor (Reips and Neuhaus, 2002). 
3.1.5 Procedure 
Participants were directed to the study site via Amazon Mechanical Turk. On 
the first webpage they saw study information and checked a box to indicate either that 
they wanted to seriously participate or that they wanted to just browse the webpages. 
Next, they were asked to report their age and sex. Following this, they were randomly 
allocated to one of the four RAPM conditions. The tasks were then presented, and 
finally, a debrief page gave a summary of the study’s purpose and provided the 
contact details for the researchers. 
 
3.2 Results 
These were 115 participants in the zero RAPM group, 141 in the one RAPM 
group, 124 in the three RAPM group, and 109 in the five RAPM group. The mean 
number of correct answers given by participants in each group is shown in Figure 5. 
Due to the non-parametric nature of the CRT data, we compared the median number 
of correct answers to the CRT across the four conditions (zero, one, three or five  
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Figure 5. Number of correct responses to the three CRT questions in the 0, 1, 3 and 5 
RAPM items first conditions. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
 
items) with a Kruskal-Wallis test. This revealed a significant main effect of 
Condition, H(3) = 14.00, p = .0033, which was further investigated with a series of 
Mann-Whitney U tests to compare each pair of conditions. We used Bonferroni 
correction to control for multiple comparisons, which made the critical alpha 0.008 
(i.e. 0.05/6). Participants who saw one RAPM (median = 2, mean = 1.42, SD = 1.23) 
scored significantly higher (58%) than those who saw none (median = 0, mean = 0.90, 
SD = 1.12), U(256) = 6216.5, z = 3.39, p = .001. Those who saw three (median = 1, 
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mean = 1.31, SD = 1.22) scored marginally higher (46%) than those who saw none, 
U(239) = 5811, z = 2.63, p = .009, but they did not score higher than those who saw 
one, U(265) = 8318, z = .71, p = .477. Participants who saw five RAPM items 
(median = 1, mean = 1.06, SD = 1.12) did not score higher than those who saw none, 
U(224) = 5737.5, z = 1.17, p = .240, or three items, U(233) = 6020.5, z = 1.51, p = 
.132 and they scored non-significantly lower (25%) than participants who saw one 
RAPM item, U(250) = 6444, z = 2.29, p = .022. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
A large sample of adults completed the CRT online after zero, one, three or five 
RAPM items. Those who saw one RAPM item scored significantly higher than those 
who saw none, and there was no additional benefit to seeing three or five RAPM  
items. This indicates that the effect of RAPM items prompting Type 2 engagement is 
not cumulative. In fact, there was a non-significant trend for more items to result in 
lower CRT scores. One possible explanation for this might be the nature of the data 
collection. Participants were taking part online for very little reward, and they 
potentially lost interest when they were asked to tackle five difficult RAPM items, 
leading to the slight drop off in CRT performance. 
 These results are very promising – they suggest that seeing just one difficult 
problem is enough to have an enduring effect on the likelihood of Type 2 thinking 
intervention. Such a technique could potentially be used in mathematics classrooms to 
encourage students to use Type 2 thinking when tackling problems that are known to 
elicit incorrect intuitive responses. Our intervention does not change the Type 1 
processing, nor does it provide additional knowledge or strategies to improve the 
quality of Type 2 thinking (as discussed above, the quality of Type 2 thinking is not 
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usually the issue, rather the unwillingness to engage it). Instead, our intervention 
appears to have made our participants more likely to question the output of their Type 
1 thinking and to re-process the problems using Type 2 thinking. This means that the 
intervention is domain-general. Some potential criticisms are addressed below.  
 
4. General discussion 
There are many areas of mathematics where incorrect intuitions can interfere 
with the application of available knowledge and procedures. Here, we investigated a 
method of encouraging the inhibition of intuition in favour of more effortful 
processing from a dual-processes perspective. The dual-processes perspective posits 
that automatic Type 1 processing provides solutions to all kinds of tasks we face on a 
day-to-day basis. In some instances, this processing is not sufficient to reach a correct 
solution and effortful Type 2 processing must be used. In two studies we investigated 
the effectiveness of asking participants to complete an overtly difficult task (requiring 
Type 2 processing) before completing a task that strongly prompts incorrect intuitive 
responses. In Study 1, we observed that participants who completed 10 minutes of 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM) before completing the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) scored significantly higher on the CRT than those who 
completed RAPM second. In Study 2, it was found that even one RAPM item 
significantly improved performance on the CRT compared to no RAPM items. 
This intervention was based on recent advancements of dual-process theories 
that have described metacognitive mechanisms which monitor the output of Type 1 
processing and prompt their inhibition when it is deemed necessary (Stanovich 2009, 
Thompson 2009). We suggest that the intervention examined here may have been 
effective via such a mechanism. RAPM items do not prompt an intuitive response – 
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they are abstract, visuo-spatial and difficult. Type 2 processing is essential in order to 
come to an answer, even an incorrect answer, and this experience may have primed 
participants’ metacognitive control processes to deem that Type 2 processing was 
necessary on the following task as well. This potential mechanism for our findings 
should be examined in future research by attempting to directly measure the 
metacognitive control processes, for example, using the methods of Thompson, 
Prowse Turner and Pennycook (2011).  
There are several encouraging features of this intervention: it is domain-
general (i.e. not tied to a specific mathematical bias), it is quick (even one RAPM 
item was effective), and the effect is fairly large (in Study 2, the mean score after one 
RAPM item increased by nearly 58% compared to zero RAPM items and the median 
score increased from 0 to 2 on a scale of 0-3). Previous interventions to encourage the 
inhibition of Type 1 biases on mathematical tasks have been either not effective or 
effective but task-specific. For example, Tirosh et al’s (1998) intervention for the 
intuitive ‘everything comes to an end’ and ‘everything can be divided’ rules, which 
was not effective, and  Houdé et al.’s (2000) matching bias intervention, which was 
effective but task-specific. 
The intervention used here targets the mechanism that decides when a Type 1 
intuition will be inhibited and Type 2 processing engaged. This processing 
architecture is thought to be general to all of cognition, meaning that an effective 
intervention of this type should be useful in all areas of mathematics (and even more 
broadly) where there is a conflict between intuition and reason. For example, when 
students are introduced to fractions or decimals, and there is a risk of their natural 
number knowledge interfering, it may be useful for them to complete a RAPM item at 
the beginning of each lesson or task (provided that they already have sufficient 
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knowledge of fractions/decimals to know that they behave differently to natural 
numbers). 
Outside of mathematics, an intervention such as the one presented here could 
potentially help people make better decisions in their day-to-day lives, for example, 
when buying cigarettes, alcohol or junk food, gambling, investing money in the stock 
market, or choosing between insurance policies. In each case decisions can be 
influenced by non-relevant factors through Type 1 thinking, such as logos 
(Janiszewski and Mayvis 2001), brand advertising (Friese, Wänke and Plessner 2006), 
or the fluency of stock names (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006, Oppenheimer 2008). 
Completing a RAPM item first may help consumers to override the influence of these 
factors through Type 1 thinking, and avoid making a bad decision. For example, 
gamblers could be required to correctly solve a RAPM item before placing a bet with 
an online bookmaker, and the extra Type 2 thinking may lead to a more thorough 
consideration of the likelihood of losing money, and subsequently to the decision to 
not place a bet. Cigarette packets could feature an explicitly difficult RAPM item, 
similar to current interventions that require health warnings to be featured on cigarette 
packets (Hammond 2011), and this may encourage additional Type 2 thinking which 
may counteract the effects of branding on the decision to smoke. Of course, such 
implementations are highly speculative but there is the potential for interventions that 
prompt Type 2 thinking to have wide ranging impact. 
The size of the effect found here was notable. In Study 1 CRT scores 
increased by 48% after 10 minutes of RAPM items, and in Study 2 they increased by 
58% after only one RAPM item. However, there was non-significant drop-off in CRT 
scores after 5 RAPM items in Study 2. One possible explanation for this is that the 
study was conducted online and participants did not have any external incentive to 
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stay focused. It may be that after five difficult RAPM items participants’ attention 
began to wander and their performance on the CRT suffered. Of course, this did not 
seem to occur in Study 1 where participants completed up to 18 RAPM items in up to 
10 minutes. However Study 1 was conducted in a group setting in a computer lab as 
part of a course module, and the presence of other students, the researchers, and the 
formal setting may have facilitated participants’ engagement with such a long and 
difficult task. It would be worthwhile to replicate Study 2 in a classroom setting to see 
whether the same drop-off trend is replicated, and if so whether it is significant. If our 
explanation is correct, then we would expect performance to be equal for the 1, 3 and 
5 item conditions.  
We have argued that the domain-generality of our intervention is a strength, 
but it could be argued that it is instead a weakness. One could argue that mathematics 
education should explicitly teach students about the tricky nature of tasks that tend to 
elicit Type 1 thinking errors, for example by warning them about common incorrect 
responses to particular tasks, and how each task should be solved correctly. Although 
our intervention is implicit (and could be used to complement rather than replace 
more explicit techniques), it is not necessarily experienced implicitly by participants. 
Our intervention made participants more likely to use Type 2 thinking on the CRT, 
but there is no reason to suppose that the intuitive responses did not still come to mind 
before being rejected and replaced with answers from Type 2 thinking, giving 
participants an awareness of the conflict between intuitive and effortful thinking. We 
suggest that our intervention made participants more aware of the insufficiency of 
their intuitive responses and the necessity of engaging Type 2 thinking. This personal 
experience of the issue may even be more effective at teaching students the tricky 
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nature of the task than simply telling them, although this is of course an empirical 
question.  
Despite the advantages of the intervention tested here, namely the speed, 
effect size, and domain-generality, there are many remaining questions to be 
answered before this intervention could be deemed useful for the classroom. Firstly, 
we do not know the duration of the effect. Our results show that the need for Type 2 
processing on the RAPM task carried over onto a subsequent task, but the CRT is a 
fairly short task and we do not know whether the same effects would be seen on a 
longer task, or after a delay. If the effect were found to be very time-limited, then it 
would not be suitable as an educational intervention. 
Future research should also investigate the effect of a RAPM pre-task on some 
of the biases discussed in the introduction. The CRT has some similarities to these 
biases – it prompts intuitive but incorrect responses, the majority of participants have 
the necessary knowledge or ability to find the correct answer, and it is mathematical 
in nature – but it is only one task and the utility of the intervention should be 
established for a variety of mathematical tasks where Type 1 and Type 2 processes 
conflict. Different tasks elicit different heuristics, and some may be easier to inhibit 
than others. It is currently unclear whether our intervention would help performance 
on tasks with stronger heuristic responses than the CRT. Similarly, it would be 
interesting to compare the effects of other difficult tasks to the RAPM to establish the 
most effective tool.  
Somewhat related to this point, it would be important for research to examine 
the intervention in different age groups, and it may well be the case that different 
intervention tasks would be suitable for different age groups. The RAPM task was 
effective in an adult sample, but it is designed for high-ability adults and may well be 
30 
 
too difficult to be effective in school students. It seems likely that a too-difficult task 
could cause students to give up rather than think harder. Raven’s Coloured 
Progressive Matrices are designed for 5- to 11-year-old children, and Raven’s 
Standard Progressive Matrices are designed for average-ability adolescents and 
adults, and within each set of Matrices there is a wide range of difficulty (hence the 
term ‘progressive’), and so these tasks would be good starting points for establishing 
the most effective interventions in different age groups. 
Finally, it would also be interesting to investigate individual differences in the 
efficacy of the intervention. It may be the case that students with higher cognitive 
ability see better effects because they have more resources available for Type 2 
processing (Stanovich 2009) or are more flexible in their level of Type 2 engagement 
(Bornermann et al. 2010). 
To conclude, we have introduced a potentially fruitful intervention based on 
dual-process theories that may encourage students to inhibit their intuitions in favour 
of using effortful thinking based on mathematical knowledge and rules.  
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Footnotes 
1. Matching bias is a perceptual bias to focus on items that have been explicitly 
named. For example, in the Wason Selection Task, the rule ‘if there is an A on 
one side of the card then there is a 3 on the other side’ can prompt participants 
into focusing only on the ‘A’ and ‘3’ cards and not considering the others 
(Wason 1968). 
2. Condition had a marginally significant effect on the number of intuitive errors, 
U(61) = 337.0, z = -1.90, p = .058, and no effect on the number of ‘other’ (not 
intuitive but not correct) errors, U(61) = 430, z = -.74, p = .462. 
3. Condition also had a significant effect on number of intuitive answers, H(3) = 
13.46, p = .004, but not on the number of ‘other’ (not intuitive but not correct) 
answers, H(3) = 2.31, p = .512. 
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